Tan Mou Sheng

Tan Mou Sheng (1990 - 2012) was an instructor of a Reconnaissance Commanders’ Course held at the Marsiling training area on 11 May this year. He was travelling with other instructors in a scout jeep and seated at the rear of that jeep. When the jeep overturned, 3SG Tan was thrown out and pinned under the jeep. 3SG Tan was extricated, attended to by a medic and evacuated in the safety vehicle to the Nee Soon Camp Medical Centre. The duty Medical Officer immediately accompanied 3SG Tan to Khoo Teck Puat Hospital via the SAF ambulance. 3SG Tan underwent emergency surgery but despite this succumbed to his injuries. According to the Health Sciences Authority, the cause of death as certified by the forensic pathologist was "haemorrhage from severe pelvic crush injuries".

The COI was of the opinion that specific instances of individual negligence and breaches of safety had contributed to 3SG Tan’s death. First, the jeep driver was not licensed to drive. The Conducting Officer had assigned the jeep driver to drive without checking if he had a license. Neither did the assigned jeep driver highlight to his superior that he was not licenced to drive a jeep. Second, the two rear passengers, one of whom was 3SG Tan, were not wearing helmets or lap belts. The Vehicle Commander did not ensure that the jeep passengers wore their helmets or lap belts.

The COI found that Combat Intelligence School, the CIS, the school in question which conducted this training package, had a weak safety culture. In the course of its investigations, the COI uncovered other previous instances of unlicensed driving. The vehicle management system was also not satisfactory, with lax access to vehicles by servicemen in the field during training. Shortly after the incident, MINDEF removed the Commanding Officer (CO) of this school, the Combat Intelligence School, Lieutenant-Colonel Vincent Lam Fei Liong. MINDEF relieved him of his command and appointed a new Commanding Officer. Other personnel in the Combat School have also been relieved of their duties:

a) The Head of the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Wing, Major Poon Chen Song; b) The School Sergeant Major, 1st Warrant Officer Lim Ser Wei; c) The exercise Supervising Officer, Lieutenant Marcus Koh Men; and d) The exercise Conducting Officer, Master Sergeant Lee Kong Kean.

All these SAF personnel have been re-deployed to assignments where they will not be supervising soldiers for training or operations.

As in the previous case, the Chief Military Prosecutor will determine if these personnel should be subjected to a General Court Martial (GCM). Police investigations are also on-going to determine whether to prosecute the personnel involved in a Civil Court and this includes the unlicensed driver of the jeep, 3SG Cavin Tan.

The vehicular management system in the CIS has been tightened. The SAF has also reviewed other units to ensure that unauthorised driving does not occur during field training. It is now mandatory for drivers to display their driving license visibly on the vehicle dashboard. All SAF units have now tightened control over the use and movement of vehicles so that the keys of that vehicle are not inadvertently handed on to unlicensed drivers.

While the SAF has a robust training safety system in place, these two incidents show that more needs to be done. The SAF is determined to put things right and correct any inadequacies uncovered. More importantly, we want to ensure that these lax attitudes toward training safety remain isolated instances and do not take root in our system.

Specifically, after these two incidents, we have already tightened the control and management of SAF vehicles in units and during field training. We will explore safer alternatives to the existing type of smoke grenade for use in training. We will reinforce measures to ensure safe management of servicemen with a history of asthma. We will also ensure that the TSRs are adhered to on the ground.

But beyond the specific measures, the SAF will also make three key systemic changes to strengthen training safety across the whole of the SAF.

First, we will deploy more safety officers on the ground. They will be designated as full-time Unit Safety Officers whose primary role will be to ensure that units and servicemen comply with safety measures.

Secondly, an Army Safety Review Board (ASRB) chaired by a senior civil servant outside MINDEF has been set up to review the Army’s overall safety structure, processes and culture. Third, the SAF will set up an SAF Inspectorate, reporting directly to the Chief of the Defence Force. The SAF Inspectorate will set the safety culture across the entire SAF and oversee the individual inspectorates of the three services. In this role it will promulgate best practices and ensure the robustness of safety related policies, that they are up to date and sound throughout the SAF.